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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year, the majority of important decisions in
the juvenile law area were made at the appellate court level. Most
of the factual situations for these cases involved delinquency rather
than abuse and neglect. The two Illinois Supreme Court cases decided during the year involved delinquency proceedings. In one
supreme court case, the court addressed the recurrent issue of no* Attorney, Ryan and Miller, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., 1969, Alverno College;
M.B.A., 1979, DePaul University; J.D., 1972, Northwestern University.
**
A.B., 1983, Brown University; J.D. candidate 1988, Loyola University of
Chicago.
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tice to potential parties in the proceedings.I The other case considered whether a minor's right to remain silent was violated when he
made an admission during a custodial interrogation.2
In the area of juvenile legislation, two important bills recently
passed both houses of the Illinois legislature.' The legislation proposes additions or changes in the area of investigations of professionals in abuse and neglect cases,4 and excusable delays in
adjudicatory hearings.5
II.

A.

CASE LAW

Notice to Parents

Illinois is distinct among the states in its frequent consideration
of notice requirements in juvenile cases over the last decade.
Although many states are struggling with definitions of subject
matter jurisdiction in juvenile courts, Illinois alone has produced
more than a dozen reviewing court decisions regarding jurisdiction
of the parties in juvenile cases.6
The United States Supreme Court in In re Gault7 ruled that parents are entitled to notice of any delinquency proceedings against
1. In re J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d 129, 485 N.E.2d 848 (1985).
2. People v. R.C., 108 Ill. 2d 349, 483 N.E.2d 1241 (1985).
3. P.A. 84-1318, 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-1318 (West); H.B. 2785, 84th Ill. Gen. Assem. (1986). See infra notes 256-77 and accompanying text.
4. P.A. 84-1318, 84th Ill. Gen. Assem. (1986).
5. H.B. 2785, 84th Ill. Gen. Assem. (1986).
6. For a review of Illinois Supreme Court decisions regarding failure to provide notice to parent or guardian, see generally In re J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d 129, 485 N.E.2d 848
(1985); People v. R.S., 104 Ill. 2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297 (1984); People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d
377, 462 N.E.2d 478 (1984); People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 445 N.E.2d 293 (1983); In re
J.W., 87 Ill. 2d 56, 429 N.E.2d 501 (1981).
For a review of Illinois appellate court cases in which failure to provide notice to a
parent or guardian was deemed to deprive Juvenile Court of jurisdiction, see generally In
re J.W.M., 123 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 463 N.E.2d 1023 (4th Dist. 1984); In re S.W.C., 110 Ill.
App. 3d 695, 442 N.E.2d 961 (4th Dist. 1982); In re R.P., 97 Ill. App. 3d 889, 423
N.E.2d 920 (3d Dist. 1981); People v. Rollins, 86 Ill. App. 3d 245, 407 N.E.2d 1143 (3d
Dist. 1980); In re C.G., 69 Ill. App. 3d 56, 387 N.E.2d 4 (3d Dist. 1979); In re T.B., 65 Ill.
App. 3d 903, 382 N.E.2d 1292 (3d Dist. 1978).
For a review of Illinois appellate court cases in which failure to provide notice to a
parent or a guardian was not deemed to deprive the Juvenile Court of jurisdiction, see
generally In re D.L.F., 136 Ill. App. 3d 873, 483 N.E.2d 1300 (3d Dist. 1985); In re G.L.,
133 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 479 N.E.2d 1234 (3d Dist. 1985); In re L.E.J., 115 Ill. App. 3d
993, 451 N.E.2d 289 (4th Dist. 1983); In re Stokes, 108 Ill. App. 3d 637, 439 N.E.2d 514
(1st Dist. 1982); In re J.A., 108 Ill. App. 3d 426, 439 N.E.2d 72 (3d Dist. 1982); In re
D.J.B., 107 Ill. App. 3d 482, 437 N.E.2d 888 (5th Dist. 1982); In re Vaught, 103 Ill. App.
3d 802, 431 N.E.2d 1231 (1st Dist. 1981).
7. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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their child.' The Illinois Legislature extended these notice requirements to the parents and guardians of children who are involved in
any type of juvenile court proceeding. 9 In Gault, the parents resided with the minor child who had been arrested, charged with a
delinquent act, and detained in custody, all without notice to the
parents. 10 The Arizona juvenile court in Gault could have notified
the minor's parents of the court proceedings. In contrast, the cases
before the Illinois courts over the last decade involved noncustodial, absent and unidentified parents, and court appointed
guardians. '
During the Survey year, the Illinois appellate court addressed
the issue of notice to a noncustodial parent.' 2 In In re D.L.F,"' a
delinquent minor challenged the trial court's conviction of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of weapons, by
arguing on appeal that notice by publication to his noncustodial
father was insufficient, thus violating the requirements of the Juvenile Court Act 4 and due process.' The named respondents to the
delinquency petitions included the minor, his mother and father,
his foster parents, his guardian, the Illinois Department of Chil16
dren and Family Services, and the Juvenile Detention Center.
In D.L.F, the State served the mother with a summons.' 7 She
did not appear at the first hearing and was defaulted without objec8. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 701-20, 704-3 to -4 (1985).
10. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5.
11. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The early appellate decisions encouraged challenges by holding that failure to provide notice under almost any circumstance would deprive the juvenile courts of jurisdiction and thus render findings of
delinquency void. Id.
This stringent approach and the numerous appeals it fostered mirrored a previous
phenomena in Illinois when the appellate courts ruled that an adjudication of wardship,
and proof of a minor's age were jurisdictional steps, the absence of which rendered the
juvenile courts devoid of jurisdiction. See In re Frazier, 60 Ill. App. 3d 119, 376 N.E.2d
643 (1st Dist. 1978) (reversed in In re Greene, 76 Ill. 2d 204, 390 N.E.2d 884 (1979)); In
re Barr, 37 111. App. 3d 10, 344 N.E.2d 517 (1st Dist. 1976). Numerous appeals and
conflicting appellate decisions followed. The Illinois Supreme Court resolved the conflicting decisions by holding that an adjudication of wardship need not be made explicitly by
the trial court. In re Jennings, 68 Ill. 2d 125, 368 N.E.2d 864 (1977). It further held that
proof of age was not a jurisdictional requirement. In re Greene, 76 Ill. 2d 204, 390
N.E.2d 884 (1979).
12. In re D.L.F., 136 Ill. App. 3d 873, 483 N.E.2d 1300 (3d Dist. 1985).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 874-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1301-02 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 701-1
to 708-4 (1985)).
15. DLF, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 875, 483 N.E.2d at 1302.
16. Id. at 874, 483 N.E.2d at 1301.
17. Id.
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tion from the minor. I8 The State did not attempt to notify the father, whose address was listed as unknown. 19 Due to this failure
to notify, the trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction and continued the case.20
Subsequently, the State mailed notice to the father at his last
known address.2" When the notice was returned with no known
forwarding address, the State published notice in Peoria and inquired about the father's whereabouts.22 When the State could not
locate the father, the trial court held the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings without the father. The trial court found the minor
to be delinquent and committed him to the Department of
Corrections.23
On appeal, the appellate court held that the trial court had
proper subject matter jurisdiction because the father was not an
indispensable party and his parental rights were not directly affected by the proceedings. 24 The court recognized that the minor
was benefitted by the presence of counsel, his legal guardian,
DCFS, and his foster parents. These parties were better sources
of assistance to the minor than an unavailable, uninvolved father.26
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the minor's conviction, and held
that the State's attempted notification violated neither the minor's
nor the father's due process rights, nor the notice requirements of
the Juvenile Court Act.27
One month later, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed and further defined the issue of notice to noncustodial parents.28 In In re
J.P.j.,29 the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated three appeals involving the failure to provide actual notice of juvenile delinquency
18. Id. The mother had previously surrendered her parental rights. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 874, 483 N.E.2d at 1302.
22. Id. The State made inquiries to the Peoria police records, the city directory, and
to an assistant state's attorney from Peoria. Id.
23. Id. at 874-75, 483 N.E.2d at 1302.
24. Id. at 876, 483 N.E.2d at 1303. The appellate court noted that the State's efforts
in locating and serving the father were duly diligent, and notice by publication was sufficient when the certified mailing to the father was undeliverable. Id. at 877, 483 N.E.2d at
1303. The appellate court further stated that the minor, who had no direct contact with
the father for over ten years, was unable to provide any additional information regarding
the father's whereabouts. Id. at 876-77, 483 N.E.2d at 1302-03.
25. D.L.F, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 876, 483 N.E.2d at 1303.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 875, 483 N.E.2d at 1303.
28. In re J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d 129, 485 N.E.2d 848 (1985).
29. Id.
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proceedings to the minor's noncustodial parents. 30 In all three situations in .J.PJ,the fathers were the noncustodial parents and the
named respondents were the minors, the mothers, and the
31
fathers.
All three minors claimed that the statutory and due process requirements of adequate notice were violated, and that the trial
court judgments were void for lack of proper subject matter jurisdiction. 32 The main issues addressed by the supreme court were
whether the notice requirements of the Juvenile Court Act 33 were
satisfied and whether the minors' due process rights were violated. 34 The supreme court concluded that paragraph 704-4(2) of
the Juvenile Court Act excused the State from notifying the children's noncustodial parents either in person or by publication 35 because the whereabouts of the fathers were unknown, and the
records did not indicate that personal or abode service by certified
mail was possible.36 Therefore, because the noncustodial fathers
30. Id. at 132, 485 N.E.2d at 848.
31. Id. at 133-34, 485 N.E.2d at 849-50. In J.P.J.'s case, the parents were divorced
and the whereabouts of the father were unknown. Id. at 133, 485 N.E.2d at 849. The
father did not attend any of the hearings and the appellate court held that no notice was
required for the father because he was not an indispensable party. Id. The trial court
found the minor delinquent and committed him to the Department of Corrections. Id.
The appellate court affirmed this judgment. Id.
In K.B.'s case, the parents also were divorced and the father's address was unknown.
Id. at 133, 485 N.E.2d at 850. The father did not attend any of the hearings. Id. At trial
the minor admitted to theft and criminal trespass to a motor vehicle, and was remanded
to residential placement and ordered to pay restitution. Id. The appellate court affirmed.
Id. The appellate court also held that notice to the custodial mother was sufficient when
the noncustodial parent did not have a significant relationship with the child. Id. at 134,
485 N.E. 2d at 850.
In J.K.'s case, the minor's parents were separated and the father was listed as living in
Chicago. The State attempted to notify him by publication, but it listed the father's name
incorrectly. Id. The error was never corrected and the father did not attend any of the
hearings. Id. The trial court found the minor guilty of resisting a peace officer, and
committed the minor to the Department of Corrections. Id. The appellate court affirmed
and further held that whatever error was made regarding notice to the father had been
waived. Id.
32. Id. at 134, 485 N.E.2d at 850.
33. Id. at 135, 485 N.E.2d at 850-51 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-4
(1985)). Paragraph 704-4 specifies the requirements for notice by certified mail or by
publication.
34. J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d at 134, 485 N.E.2d at 850.
35. Id. at 135-37, 485 N.E.2d at 850-51 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-4(2)
(1985)). The Juvenile Court Act excuses service to a noncustodial parent who cannot be
served directly with process, when proper service had been made on the custodial parent,
and no order or judgment was issued against the noncustodial parent. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, para. 704-4(2) (1985).
36. J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d at 135-37, 485 N.E.2d at 850-51. The supreme court in JP.J.
also cited to the 1984 Illinois Supreme Court case of In re R.S. which held that service on
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could not be served directly and no order was issued against them,
service by publication was excused under paragraph 704-4(2) of the
Juvenile Court Act.37 The court determined that service was not
required when the custodial parent had actual notice, and the noncustodial parent did not have a significant relationship with the
child.3" When these factors existed, there did not appear to be any
harm to the minor if the noncustodial parent did not appear at the
proceedings. 39 The statutory notice requirements were complied
with and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed all three convictions
of the minors.4
The Illinois Supreme Court in J.P.J. held that because it detera noncustodial parent was necessary when his or her whereabouts were known. J.P.J.,
109 11. 2d at 136, 485 N.E.2d 851 (1984) (citing In re R.S., 104 Ill. 2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297
(1984)). In R.S., the minor's mother was a named respondent. Although her address was
known, the mother was never served. R.S., 104 Ill. 2d at 3, 470 N.E.2d at 298. The
Illinois Supreme Court in R.S. held that failure to notify the minor's mother meant the
State did not properly invoke the trial court's jurisdiction, thereby rendering the trial
court judgment void. Id. at 6, 470 N.E.2d at 300. The Illinois Supreme Court, in J.P.J.,
reasoned that because the court in R.S. required service to a noncustodial parent whose
whereabouts were known, the holding did not mandate service to a noncustodial parent
whose whereabouts were unknown. J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d at 136, 485 N.E.2d at 852.
37. J.FJ., 109 Ill. 2d at 138-39, 485 N.E.2d at 852.
38. Id. at 136-37, 485 N.E.2d at 851. Furthermore, no judgment or order could be
entered against the noncustodial parent at the proceedings. Id. at 137, 485 N.E.2d at
851.
39. Id. at 136, 485 N.E.2d at 851. See also In re R. D., 148 Ill. App. 3d 381, 499
N.E.2d 478 (1st Dist. 1986). In this recent delinquency case, the Illinois appellate court
held that the State was relieved of its obligation to notify both the noncustodial father and
stepfather when the mother was properly served, and notice by publication to the noncustodial parent was excused by paragraph 704-4(2) of the Juvenile Court Act. In addition
to relying on In re J.P.J., the court in R. D. relied on the earlier Illinois Supreme Court
case of In re J.W., 87 Ill. 2d 56, 429 N.E.2d 501 (1981). The court in J. W held that
failure to notify a father by publication, whose whereabouts were unknown and who was
not an indispensable party, deprived the court of personal jurisdiction over the father, but
did not result in lack of subject matter jurisdiction or deprive the court of jurisdiction
over the minor or his mother. R. D., 148 Ill. App. 3d at 385, 499 N.E.2d at 480. Additionally, the court held that if there was no significant relationship between the minor and
the noncustodial parent, then notice was probably not necessary. Id.
Recent appellate court decisions have also considered the issue of notice with regard to
guardians. See In re J.A., 145 Ill. App. 3d 816, 495 N.E.2d 1340 (3d Dist. 1986). In In
re J.A., an abuse and neglect case, the appellate court affirmed the award of temporary
custody of two children to the guardianship administrator of DCFS. Id. at 820, 495
N.E.2d at 1343. The mother challenged the jurisdiction of the circuit court because service was not made on the legal guardian from DCFS. The court held, however, that the
guardian submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 819, 495 N.E.2d at 1342.
The court held that DCFS had actual notice of the proceedings, and there would be no
useful purpose in holding that further technical notice was required. Id. The court
avoided vacating the orders of the circuit court by finding that there was actual, although
not technically correct, notice of the DCFS guardian, which thereby properly invoked the
circuit court's jurisdiction. Id.
40. J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d at 140, 485 N.E.2d at 853.
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mined that notice requirements were satisfied in all three minors'
cases, it did not have to address the minors' additional argument
that failure to provide the statutorily required notice would deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction.4 Consequently, the Illinois Supreme
Court avoided the question of whether lack of notice to a noncustodial parent poses a jurisdictional problem. 2 Instead, the court
held that a statutory provision that, on its face, provides that the
juvenile court cannot enter orders against persons over whom it
has no personal jurisdiction means that the State need not serve
notice by publication to noncustodial parents whose precise address is not known. 43 The issue of whether the State has used
diligence to ascertain the noncustodial parent's address is a ques41. The supreme court also held that there was no showing of the State's lack of
diligence to give notice, and that the burden was upon the minor's counsel at the trial
level to raise the issue of failure of notice to a parent. Id. at 139, 485 N.E.2d at 852.
42. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court might have resolved the lack of notice issues by
adopting the approach taken in the Illinois appellate court case of In re L.E.J., 115 Ill.
App. 3d 993, 451 N.E.2d 289 (4th Dist. 1983). In L.E.J., the court described juvenile
court subject matter jurisdiction as follows:
Under the Constitution of 1970, the circuit court has original jurisdiction 'of all
justiciable matters.' ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9. While that term is not easily
defined, in the juvenile court its apparent meaning is an offense for which the
juvenile may be accountable. This is what has traditionally been designated as
subject matter jurisdiction.
L.E.J., 115 Ill. App. 3d at 996, 451 N.E.2d at 292.
The court then distinguished jurisdiction of the person from jurisdiction of the subject
matter:
Jurisdiction of persons under the Juvenile Court Act is regulated by the statute
and is one of the conditions precedent to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. (Mears.) To state the matter another way, subject matter jurisdiction is
the power of the court to adjudicate; personal jurisdiction is the ability to exercise that power as to particular individuals. Lack of personal jurisdiction does
not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction; only the ability to exercise
its power upon those who have not been brought into court by summons or
otherwise.
Id. at 997, 451 N.E.2d at 292.
The appellate court held that the court did have jurisdiction of the minor, the mother
and the legal guardian. The court also noted that the absent father was not an indispensable party. Id. at 997-98, 451 N.E.2d at 292-93. The juvenile court orders regarding the
minor, the mother and the guardian thus were not void. Id.
By not adopting the reasoning of L.E.J., and relying instead on a limited statutory
provision, the Illinois Supreme Court in J.PJ.left the door open to more appeals regarding notice provisions. J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d at 135, 485 N.E.2d at 850-51 (citing ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-4(2) (1985)).
43. J.P.J., 109 Ill.2d at 135, 485 N.E.2d at 850-51 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
para. 704-4(2) 0985)). "[N]otice by publication is not required in any case when the
person alleged to have legal custody of the minor has been served with a summons personally or by certified mail, but the court may not issue any order or judgment against
any person who cannot be served with process other than by publication unless notice by
publication is given or unless that person appears." Id.
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tion of fact which the minor must raise in the juvenile court or
waive for appeal.
In separate dissents, two justices strongly objected to this decision, referring to an Illinois Supreme Court decision that formerly
held that the State's failure to provide notice to a parent rendered
the juvenile proceedings void because the court did not have jurisdiction." Because jurisdictional issues cannot be waived, the dissent argued that the minors' failure to raise the issue of the State's
compliance with the notice provisions of the Juvenile Court Act
should not result in a waiver of that issue.45
B.

Notice to Minors

Although the Illinois Supreme Court in J.P.J. addressed the issue of notice to a noncustodial parent in a juvenile court proceeding, the issue of proper notice to the minor continued to trouble the
Illinois appellate courts during the Survey year. The critical issue
regarding service of notice to minors involves their presumed incapacity at law. In Illinois, a minor cannot submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court and a guardian has no authority to submit
the minor to the jurisdiction of the court by filing an appearance.46
Therefore, 47"the symbolic act of actual or constructive service is
required. ,
In In re PhillipDay,48 the State charged the parents with abuse
and neglect of their twenty-three-day-old infant, and sought to terminate their parental rights. 49 At the adjudicatory hearing, the
trial court found the child was physically abused, and at the dispositional hearing, the court terminated the parental rights.5 0 On appeal, the parents asserted that because the minor had never been
served with a summons or notice of the proceedings, the trial court
lacked proper jurisdiction. 1 The appellate court in Day noted that
the Illinois Supreme Court had addressed the issue of service on a
44. J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d at 140-42, 485 N.E.2d at 853 (Moran, J., and Simon, J., dissenting). The dissenters in J.PJ. noted that because jurisdiction could not be waived, the
majority effectively overruled the holding in R.S.. Id. at 140-42, 485 N.E.2d at 853-54
(Moran, J., and Simon, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Moran, J., and Simon, J., dissenting).
46. Bonnell v. Holt, 89 Ill. 71 (1878).
47. In re A.J.S. a/k/a A.J.N., No. 4-85-0372, (4th Dist. Jan. 28, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Ill. file).
48. 138 Ill. App. 3d 783, 486 N.E.2d 307 (4th Dist. 1985).
49. Id. at 784, 486 N.E.2d at 307.
50. Id. at 785, 486 N.E.2d at 308.
51. Id.
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noncustodial parent in In re J..J.52 Nevertheless, because the
supreme court had not yet addressed the issue of service of process
on the minor, the appellate court stated that it was compelled to
follow the holding of In re Crouch.53 The appellate court in
Crouch held that failure to notify a known respondent in a juvenile
proceeding resulted in the failure to properly invoke the circuit
court's jurisdiction, thus making all orders at the trial court level
voidable. 54 In the Day case, it was clear that the infant was a
known respondent and had not been properly notified." Yet, the
State argued that this failure to notify the infant did not violate his
due process rights.5 6 The State claimed that the error was clearly
harmless because the infant would not have comprehended such
notice. The State further argued that the infant's appointed guardian had actual notice and had appropriately represented the infant's interests. 7 The court in Day acknowledged that the actual
service on an infant would be meaningless, but concluded that it
was for the legislature, and not the court, to provide an alternative
means of service for such a child." The court thus chose to adhere
to the Crouch decision, reversing and remanding the trial court's
orders. 59 The court held that those orders were void as to the infant

52. Id. at 787, 486 N.E.2d at 309-10 (citing J.PJ., 109 Il. 2d 139, 485 N.E.2d 848
(1985)). See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
53. Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 786, 486 N.E.2d at 309 (citing In re Crouch, 131 Ill.
App. 3d 694, 476 N.E.2d 69 (4th Dist.), appeal denied, 106 Ill. 2d 554 0985)).
54. Crouch, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 694, 476 N.E.2d at 69.
55. Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 785, 486 N.E.2d at 308.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 786, 486 N.E.2d at 309.
58. Id. at 787, 486 N.E.2d at 310. See 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to
be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3), infra notes 261-277 and accompanying text. The Illinois Legislature, in passing the Act addressed the problem of requiring
notice to minors which was raised in the Day case. It amends ILL. REV. STAT. ch 37,
para. 704-3 regarding summonses. The Act deletes the requirement of sending a summons to a minor and instead allows for the summons to be directed to the minor's legal
guardian or custodian on behalf of the minor in juvenile court proceedings. Id. This
change eliminates the problem addressed in the Day case by no longer requiring a summons to be served on an infant who would not understand it. While this may rectify the
issue in delinquency matters, service to a parent who may be adversarial to the child (for
example, in an abuse, neglect, dependency or minor requiring authoritative intervention
case) appears to defeat the spirit of the law. There is no assurance that the adversarial
parent will tell the child of the court proceedings, although the minor's attorney or
guardian ad litem should accomplish this if the child is old enough to understand. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-5 (1985). Perhaps a statutory provision similar to that for
disabled persons, requiring the guardian ad litem to advise the minor in person of the
court proceedings and of the minor's rights in these proceedings would be appropriate.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37. paras. lla-10, -11 (1985).
59. Day, 138 Il. App. 3d at 788, 486 N.E.2d at 310.
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minor, and were voidable as to the parents.' °
A recent appellate court case followed the Day decision and required proper notice to a minor in a juvenile proceeding.6 1 In In re
A.JS., a/k/a A.J.N.,62 the trial court adjudged the minor to be
delinquent, and committed him to the Department of Corrections.
The minor was present throughout the trial court proceedings,
though neither the minor nor the noncustodial father were
served. 63 The appellate court held that although service on the minor would have been effectively meaningless, the court was required to adhere to the prior holdings of In re Crouch and In re
Phillip Day.6' In relying on Crouch and Day, the appellate court
held that the minor had no power to submit himself to the court's
jurisdiction as a defendant or as a respondent until the actual or
symbolic act of constructive service. 65 Therefore, because the minor was not properly served with notice, the minor's right to due
process was violated.66
During the Survey year, the Illinois courts frequently addressed
the issue of notice in juvenile court proceedings. At present, Illinois law requires actual service of notice to a minor for a juvenile
court proceeding. The age of the minor is irrelevant. The presence
of the minor in court is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction of the
person. The legislature is aware of the problems which the Day
court and the A.J.S. court have highlighted. With the introduction
of Public Act 84-1460,67 the Illinois Legislature attempted to remedy the problematic requirements of service of process on minors.
60. Id. at 787, 486 N.E.2d at 310. A void judgment has no legal force or binding
effect. A voidable judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction, but is irregularly
and erroneously rendered. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1411-12 (5th ed. 1979).
61. In re A.J.., a/k/a A.J.N., No. 4-85-0372 (4th Dist. Jan. 28, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Ill. file).
62. Id.
63. Id. With regard to lack of service on the noncustodial father, the appellate court
held that such notice was necessary because the minor did have a significant relationship
with the father. Id. See also In re J.W., 87 Ill. 2d 56, 429 N.E.2d 501 (1981) (notice was
not necessary to a noncustodial father who did not have a significant relationship with the
minor).
64. A.J.S., No. 4-85-0372 (citing In re Crouch, 131 Ill. App. 3d 694, 476 N.E.2d 69
(4th Dist.), appeal denied, 106 Ill. 2d 554 (1985)). In re Phillip Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d 783,
486 N.E.2d 307 (4th Dist. 1985)). See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
65. A.J.S., No. 4-85-0327.
66. Id.
67. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460 (West). See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 261-77 and accompanying text.
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C.

Appointment of Counsel

Two appellate court cases during the Survey year addressed appointment of counsel issues in delinquency proceedings. 68 In re
MLK 69 involved a delinquency proceeding in which the detention
hearing was held before counsel was appointed or the minor was
advised of his rights."0
At the detention hearing, a deputy sheriff testified that the minor
had burglarized a school locker room.71 The sheriff further explained that the minor had admitted to him earlier that he committed this offense in addition to two other burglaries.72 After this
testimony, both the minor and his mother declined to present any
evidence.7 3 The court then advised the minor of his right to counsel at future hearings and provided the minor with the name of his
appointed attorney.74 The court ordered the minor to be detained
until a future hearing could be held. 75 At the adjudicatory hearing,
the court held the minor was delinquent, and placed him on probation.76 On appeal, the minor argued that his right to counsel was
denied when the court held the detention hearing before the appointment of counsel or the advisement of his rights.7 7
The appellate court in ML.K acknowledged that certain due
process safeguards applied to minors in juvenile proceedings, even
though such proceedings are not criminal proceedings.78 Juveniles
must be represented by counsel during proceedings to determine
delinquency. 79 The court in M.L.K cited to In re Giminez,80 not68. In re M.L.K., 136 Ill. App. 3d 376, 483 N.E.2d 662 (4th Dist. 1985); In re R. D.,
148 Ill. App. 3d 381, 499 N.E.2d 478 (1st Dist. 1986).
69. 136 Ill. App. 3d 376, 483 N.E.2d 662 (4th Dist. 1985).
70. Id. at 378, 483 N.E.2d at 664. The minor was accused of committing three burgaries. Id.
71. Id. at 378, 483 N.E.2d at 663.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 377, 483 N.E.2d at 662.
77. Id. at 378, 483 N.E.2d at 664.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 379, 483 N.E.2d at 664 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
80. In re Giminez, 23 Ill. App. 3d 583, 319 N.E.2d 570 (3d Dist. 1974). In 1970, the
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal proceeding was entitled
to legal representation at the preliminary hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970). In 1974, in In re Giminez, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District
decided that a detention hearing in juvenile court was similar to a preliminary hearing in
criminal court, and that a minor at a detention hearing needed legal counsel for reasons
similar to a defendant's need for an attorney at a preliminary hearing. Giminez, 23 Ill.
App. 3d at 585-86, 319 N.E.2d at 572-73.
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ing that a detention hearing was comparable to a preliminary hearing in criminal proceedings, and that this was a critical stage in the
criminal process which called for the right to counsel. 8 ' Furthermore, counsel at a detention hearing could perform many functions similar to counsel at a preliminary hearing.82
The minor in M.L.K asserted that the lack of counsel at his
detention hearing prevented challenges to incriminating State evidence."3 The appellate court noted that the evidence offered at the
adjudicatory hearing was similar to the evidence at the detention
hearing. 84 Admitting that the detention hearing was a significant
legal step requiring representation by an attorney, the appellate
court concluded that the absence of the attorney at the detention
hearing did not prejudice the minor in his defense of the delinquency charges.8 5 Because counsel did not undermine the State's
evidence at the adjudicatory hearing, the court reasoned that
he
86
would have been equally ineffective at the detention hearing.
Additionally, the appellate court in M.L.K. noted that the Juvenile Court Act allowed for detention when there was an urgent
necessity to protect the minor or the person or property of another.87 According to the Act, individual factors of the minor's
situation, including his delinquency record, are to be considered in
making this determination. 8 Considering the minor's repeat offender status and his uncontrollable nature, the appellate court
held that the provision of counsel at the detention hearing probably
would not have affected the minor's detention. 9 Therefore, the
court ruled that the minor was not prejudiced by the lack of ap81. ML.K., 136 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 483 N.E.2d at 664 (citing Giminez, 23 Ill. App.
3d 583, 319 N.E.2d 570).
82. ML.K., 136 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 483 N.E.2d at 664. The United States Supreme
Court has noted that counsel could perform the following four functions at a preliminary
hearing: expose fatal weaknesses of the State's case; use interrogation to create an impeachment tool for use in cross-examination at trial; discover the State's case to help
prepare a better trial defense; and at the preliminary hearing, counsel could be influential
regarding bail and other such pretrial matters. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9.
83. M.L.K, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 380, 483 N.E.2d at 665.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 381, 483 N.E.2d at 665.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 703-6(2) (1985)).
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 703-6(2) (1985). Paragraph 703-6(2) provides in
relevant part: "Factors to be considered include: the nature and seriousness of the alleged offense; the minor's record of delinquency offenses, including whether the minor
has delinquency cases pending; and the availability of noncustodial alternatives, including
the presence of a parent or other responsible relatives able and willing to provide supervision and care for the minor." M.L.K, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 381, 483 N.E.2d at 665.
89. M.L.K., 136 Ill. App. 3d at 381, 483 N.E.2d at 665.
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pointment of counsel at his detention hearing. 90
The appellate court's conclusion was bolstered by the court's
reminder that the minor had a statutory right to a detention rehearing once he retained an attorney, yet the minor never requested a rehearing. 9' In view of this provision for a rehearing, it
is difficult to argue in a case with no rehearing, that the lack of
representation in the initial detention hearing prejudiced the minor
at trial.
Another appellate court case addressed the issue of an appointed
attorney who also served as the juvenile's guardian ad litem.9 2 In
In re R.D. ,93 the court simply reaffirmed the notion that there is no
inherent conflict when an attorney in a juvenile proceeding also
fills the role of the child's guardian ad litem. 94 The court stated
that the juvenile counsel and the guardian ad litem essentially have
the same obligations to both the minor and society. 95 This decision
follows clear precedent in Illinois. 9 6 The Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District thus affirmed that a court-appointed counsel
for a minor has an obligation to act in the best interests of the
minor, a responsibility unique from that of other court appointed
counsel.
D.

Admissions

The Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed that a statement is inadmissible when made by an accused during custodial interrogation
and after the accused has invoked his or her right to remain si90. Id. at 381, 483 N.E.2d at 666.
91. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 703-6(3) (1985)). This statutory provision
would have allowed the minor a rehearing without demonstrating prejudice resulting
from lack of counsel at his detention hearing. MLK, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 381, 483
N.E.2d at 666. The minor had a statutory right to rehearing, yet his counsel neglected to
assert this right to the court. Id.
92. In re R.D., 148 Ill. App. 3d, 381, 499 N.E.2d 478 (1st Dist. 1986). See also supra
note 39.
93. R.D., 148 Ill. App. 3d 381, 499 N.E.2d 478.
94. Id. at 386-87, 499 N.E.2d at 481.
95. Id. at 387, 499 N.E.2d at 482.
96. See, e.g., In re K.M.B., 123 Ill. App. 3d 645, 462 N.E.2d 1271 (4th Dist. 1984). In
KMB., the public defender also served as the minor's guardian ad litem during delinquency proceedings. The attorney made recommendations to the trial court that were in
conflict with the wishes of the child. The appellate court held that the juvenile counsel
must protect the juvenile's legal rights, and also make recommendations in the juvenile's
best interest, even when the juvenile himself does not recognize those interests. The appellate court upheld this counsel's dual role, even though counsel, in protecting the juvenile's best interest, made a recommendation contrary to the juvenile's wishes. KM.B.,
123 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 462 N.E.2d at 1273.
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lent. 97 The Illinois Supreme Court case of People v. R.C 9 involved a minor's admission of burglary during a custodial
interrogation. Before he was questioned at the police station, the
interrogating juvenile officer advised him of his Miranda rights.9 9
The minor stated that he understood his rights and did not wish to
talk. The officer responded that although the minor had the right
to remain silent, he already had been identified in connection with
the burglary. 100 The officer then proceeded to question the minor
until the minor admitted to his participation in the burglary. 10 '
The minor was found guilty at a jury trial and sentenced to the
Department of Corrections. 10 2 The appellate court held that the
officer's persisminor's right to remain silent was violated by the103
tent questioning, but that the error was harmless.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new adjudicatory hearing. 104 The court held
that not only was the minor's right to remain silent violated, but
the admission of the minor's confession was not harmless error. 105
The court asserted that a statement is admissible if, after the
suspect was advised of his Miranda rights, he voluntarily waived
his rights before he made his statement."0 6 Furthermore, even if a
suspect waived those rights and began to make a statement, the
interrogation must cease if the suspect gives any indication that he
wishes to remain silent. 107 If questioning continued, any statement
made may be admitted only when the suspect's right to remain
silent was "scrupulously honored."' 1 8 In applying this rationale to
2d 349, 483 N.E.2d 1241 (1985).
97. People v. R.C., 108 I11.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 352, 483 N.E.2d at 1243. According to the court in Miranda v. Arizona,
prior to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be warned that he has the right to
remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney who is either retained or appointed. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
100. R.C., 108 Ill. 2d at 352, 483 N.E.2d at 1243.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 351, 483 N.E.2d at 1242.
103. Id. at 351, 483 N.E.2d at 1243.
104. Id. at 356, 483 N.E.2d at 1245.
105. Id. The court held that because the confession was the foundation of the State's
case the admission of the confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
106. Id. at 353, 483 N.E.2d at 1243 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
107. Id.
108. R.C., 108 Ill. 2d at 353, 483 N.E.2d at 1243 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96 (1976)). In Mosley, the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's
right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. The defendant had been advised of his
Miranda rights before the initial interrogation. When he said he did not want to discuss
the crime in question, the police ceased interrogation immediately. Several hours later,

1986]

Juvenile Law

a juvenile in a custodial interrogation, the Illinois Supreme Court
in R. C. found that the juvenile's right to remain silent had not been
scrupulously honored,1 °9 and held that the minor's confession was
10
inadmissible at trial.
When a minor makes an admission of an offense, that admission
must be intelligently and voluntarily made. "' In In re S.K, I12 the
Illinois appellate court ruled that "fundamental fairness" served as
the standard for testing whether a minor voluntarily and intelligently admitted to delinquency." 3 In S.K, the minor admitted to
the trial judge that he committed the offense of resisting a peace
officer." 4 At the dispositional hearing, he was committed to the
Department of Corrections." 5 The minor claimed, on appeal, that
his admission was not voluntarily or intelligently made because the
trial judge had not admonished him of the consequences of his
6
admission. '

The court in S.K relied on a previous Illinois Supreme Court
holding, 1 7 to conclude that in juvenile court, a minor who makes
an admission of a delinquent act is entitled, at minimum, to that
protection which is constitutionally required for admisssions in
criminal trials."' Thus, the trial judge must ensure that the suspect comprehends the potential consequences resulting from an adafter being read his Miranda rights again, the defendant was questioned about an entirely
different crime. Thus, because the defendant was read his rights a second time, was questioned by a different officer about a different crime, and a substantial amount of time had
passed since the initial interrogation, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's right
to remain silent had been scrupulously honored. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
109. R.C. 108 Ill. 2d at 354, 483 N.E.2d at 1244.
110. Id. at 356, 483 N.E.2d at 1245.
ill. In re S.K., 137 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1069, 485 N.E.2d 578, 582 (2d Dist. 1985).
See also In re D.L.B., 140 Ill. App. 3d 52, 56, 488 N.E.2d 313, 315 (4th Dist. 1986) (a
minor's due process rights were violated when his admission was neither intelligently or
voluntarily made because the trial court did not advise the minor of the possible consequences of such an admission).
112. 137 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 485 N.E.2d 578 (2d Dist. 1985).
113. Id. at 1070, 485 N.E.2d at 582.
114. Id. at 1066, 485 N.E.2d at 579.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 362 N.E.2d 1024 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016
(1978). In Beasley, the Illinois Supreme Court held that when a trial judge accepts an
admission of a delinquent act by a minor, the judge is not obligated to follow the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402, which was adopted in order to assure procedural rights to defendants in criminal proceedings. Id. at 389, 362 N.E.2d at 1026. An
admission must be intelligently and voluntarily made, but it need not necessarily be in
accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402.
118. S.K, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 1069, 485 N.E.2d at 581 (citing In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d
385, 362 N.E.2d 1024 (1977)).
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mission.119 In S.K, the minor was not advised of the possible
commitment to the Department of Corrections. 120 Thus, the appellate court held that the minor's admission was not voluntarily
or intelligently made. 121
E. Dispositions
1. Department of Corrections Sentences
During the Survey year, a number of Illinois appellate court decisions discussed the appropriateness of dispositions for juvenile offenders, many of which involved sentences to the Department of
Corrections. In In re D. T., 22 the Illinois Appellate Court upheld
the constitutionality of paragraph 702-7(6) of the Juvenile Court
Act, which gives criminal courts jurisdiction over fifteen-year-old
and sixteen-year-old defendants charged with murder. 23 In D. T,
a minor was charged with murder and prosecuted as an adult in a
criminal proceeding pursuant to paragraph 702-7(6) of the Juvenile
Court Act.' 24 After a bench trial, the minor was found guilty of
involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to the Department of
Corrections. 25 The minor, on appeal, claimed that paragraph 7027(6)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act 26 violated the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection. 27 The appellate
court stated that prior Illinois courts had found paragraph 7027(6) of the Act to be constitutional and nonviolative of due process
and equal protection guarantees. 28 Thus, the reviewing court
119. S.K., 137 Ill. App. 3d at 1069, 485 N.E.2d at 581.
120. Id. at 1070, 485 N.E.2d at 582.
121. Id.
122. 141 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 490 N.E.2d 1361 (1st Dist. 1986).
123. Id. at 1039, 490 N.E.2d at 1363 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-7(6)
(1985)). Section (a) of paragraph 702-7(6) provides that if a minor age fifteen or older is
charged with murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or armed robbery with a firearm, he is automatically transferred to the criminal court and prosecuted as an adult
pursuant to the Criminal Code of 1961. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-7(6)(a) (1985).
124. D.T., 141 Ill. App. 3d at 1036, 490 N.E.2d at 1361 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, para. 702-7(6)(a) (1985)). See People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 469 N.E.2d 1090 (1984)
(upholding the constitutionality of paragraph 702-7(6)).
125. D.T, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 1038, 490 N.E.2d at 1363.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-7(6)(c) (1985). If a minor was charged pursuant to the provisions of 702-7(6)(a), and was in fact convicted of a different lesser offense,
the court can use its discretion to sentence the minor as a juvenile under the Act, or as an
adult under Illinois criminal law. For the specified provisions of paragraph 702-7(6)(a),
see supra note 123.
127. D.T., 141 Ill. App. 3d at 1039, 490 N.E.2d at 1363.
128. Id. at 1043, 490 N.E.2d at 1366 (citing People v. Williamson, 131 Ill. App. 3d
321, 475 N.E.2d 938 (1st Dist. 1985)). In Williamson, a sixteen-year-old minor was
charged with murder and armed violence and was prosecuted as an adult pursuant to the
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ruled that the trial court in D. T. did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing the minor as an adult. 129
30
The minor in D. T. further claimed that paragraph 702-7(6)(c)
violated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution because
it conflicted with the legislative intent of the Act and was not reasonably designed to remedy that which was determined to be a
threat to the public.13 ' The minor claimed that this section was
intended to apply only to serious offenders who committed crimes
as defined in 702-7(6)(a), 32 and not to apply to children who committed crimes without felonious intent.133 The appellate court rejected this argument because paragraph 702-7(6)(c) 134 allows for
the court to use its discretion in sentencing the minor as a juvenile
or as an adult. '31 Concluding that the statutory provision did not
violate the due process clause, the appellate court affirmed the
disposition. 136
In People v. Clark, 37 another recent appellate court decision, a
minor was tried as an adult pursuant to a juvenile court waiver
Juvenile Court Act. Williamson, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 922, 475 N.E.2d at 939. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-7(6)(a) 0985). See supra note 123. The minor was found guilty
of manslaughter and sentenced as an adult. The minor claimed, on appeal, that paragraph 702-7(6) was unconstitutional because it failed to provide guidelines for the court
to determine whether to sentence the minor as an adult or a juvenile. The appellate court
held that the section was constitutional because the Juvenile Court Act provided certain
standards and guidelines to be used in determining whether to sentence a minor as a
juvenile or as an adult. Williamson, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 324, 475 N.E.2d at 941.
The appellate court in Williamson noted that paragraph 702-7(3)(a) provided standards for determining waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction in the case of minors thirteen
years of age or older who commit criminal acts. Williamson, 131 111. App. 3d at 324-25,
475 N.E.2d at 941 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-7(3)(a) (1985)). The six
standards set forth by the court include sufficiency of the evidence; the aggressiveness and
premeditated manner in which the offense was committed; the minor's age; the minor's
history; available treatment facilities; and the best interests of the minor and the security
of the public. Williamson, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 324-25, 475 N.E.2d at 941.
129. D.T., 141 Ill. App. 3d at 1043, 490 N.E.2d at 1366.
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-7(6)(c) (1985). See supra note 126.
131. D. T., 141 Ill. App. 3d at 1044, 490 N.E.2d at 1367. The defendant claimed that
paragraph 702-7(6)(c) was intended to apply only to hardened youth offenders who were
a public threat because they had commited murder, armed robbery with a firearm or
deviate sexual assault, and that it should not apply to juveniles who had made mistakes
without prior intent. Id.
132. See supra note 123.
133. D.T, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 1044, 490 N.E.2d at 1367.
134. See supra note 126.
135. Id. at 1044-45, 490 N.E.2d at 1367.
136. Id. at 1045, 490 N.E.2d at 1367-68. See also In re T.A.C., 138 Ill. App. 3d 794,
486 N.E.2d 375 (4th Dist. 1985) (upholding the minor's commitment to the Department
of Corrections stressing the trial court's wide discretion in determining the appropriate
disposition).
137. 144 Ill. App. 3d 420, 494 N.E.2d 551 (4th Dist. 1986).
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hearing provided for in paragraph 702-7(3) of the Juvenile Court
Act. 13 In Clark, a fourteen-year-old minor was transferred for
prosecution as an adult for two murders, pursuant to paragraph
702-7(3) of the Juvenile Court Act. 139 The minor was found guilty
of both murders." 4 The appellate court held that the juvenile
court complied with the statutory requirements of paragraph 7027(3) before waiving jurisdiction of the minor's case to the criminal
court. 141

When the criminal court convicted the minor of two murders, it
followed the mandatory provisions of the Illinois Revised Statutes
and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on the fourteen-yearold minor. 4 2 The appellate court rejected the minor's argument
that the juvenile court judge had failed to consider that the waiver
to criminal court and conviction of the minor for the two murder
charges bound the criminal
court to sentence the minor to impris43
onment for natural life.'
The minor further asserted that a mandatory life sentence for a
fourteen-year-old minor violated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution. 44 The minor claimed that the mandatory life
imprisonment requirement set out in the Illinois Revised Statutes
was meant to apply to adults who were eligible for, but did not
receive, the death penalty. 4 5 The court rejected the defendant's
argument, relying instead on two recent Illinois cases'46 which af138. Clark, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 421, 494 N.E.2d at 551 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
para. 702-7(3) (1985)). Paragraph 702-7(3) provides for prosecution of a minor, thirteen
years old or older, for any offense if, upon motion of a state's attorney and after an
investigation, a Juvenile Judge enters an order permitting such prosecution). Prosecution
as an adult is permitted when the court finds it is not in the best interest of the minor or
society to prosecute the juvenile according to the Juvenile Court Act. The Act specifies
criteria to be considered by the court in making this determination. Id. at 423, 494
N.E.2d at 553. For a list of those criteria see supra note 128.
139. Clark, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 421, 494 N.E.2d at 551.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 427, 494 N.E.2d at 556.
142. Id. at 422, 494 N.E.2d at 552 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8l(a)(1)(c) (1985)).
143. Id. at 428, 494 N.E.2d at 557. The message to defense counsel under these
circumstances is clear. At a juvenile court waiver hearing, it is imperative to argue in
mitigation that transfer to criminal court and conviction therein will result in a life sentence of imprisonment to an accused minor, whereas trial in juvenile court leaves the
judge with options for sentencing.
The dissent argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting the waiver
to criminal court on the facts of this case. Id. at 433, 494 N.E.2d at 560 (Green, J.,
dissenting).
144. Clark, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 430, 494 N.E.2d at 558 (citing ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2).
145. Clark 144 Ill. App. 3d at 430, 494 N.E.2d at 558.
146. Id. at 430-31, 494 N.E.2d at 558 (citing People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 464
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firmed life imprisonment sentences for a sixteen and a fifteen-yearold minor respectively.147 In Clark, the appellate court stated that
the seriousness of a multiple murder existed regardless of whether
the actor was a juvenile or an adult. 48 The court then asserted
that if the legislature had intended the offense of murder to be of a
less heinous quality when committed by a juvenile, it would have
specified this in the statute.'49
The minor in Clark also asserted that mandatory life imprisonment violated eighth 50 and fourteenth amendment' 51 rights provided by the United States Constitution. 52 He claimed the
disposition was unconstitutional because the statute made no provisions for consideration of mitigating evidence as was required in
death penalty cases.' 53 Noting that age had been a major mitigating factor in death penalty cases, 5 4 the court in Clark stressed the
qualitative difference between the death penalty and life imprisonment."' In rejecting the minor's constitutional argument, the appellate court highlighted the public safety interest in life sentences
for multiple murders. 156 The court thus affirmed the minor's life
sentence holding that the minor was properly transferred
to the
57
criminal court according to the Juvenile Court Act. 1
2.

Probation Sentences

During the Survey year, three appellate court cases considered
issues regarding probation sentences for minors. 5 " In In re
N.E.2d 1059 (1984) and People v. Rodriguez, 134 Ill. App. 3d 582, 480 N.E.2d 1147 (1st
Dist. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1476 (1986)).
147. Clark, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 430-31, 494 N.E.2d at 558 (citing Rodriguez, 134 Ill.
App. 3d 582, 480 N.E.2d 1147). In Rodriguez, the court rejected the minor's argument
that a life sentence was contradictory to the express intent of the legislature, which exempted minors from the death penalty. The court held that a life sentence was appropriate for a minor because it was qualitatively different from the death penalty. Rodriguez,
134 Ill. App. 3d at 593, 480 N.E.2d at 1154.
148. Clark, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 431, 494 N.E.2d at 558.
149. Id. at 431, 494 N.E.2d at 559. The minor in Clark presented no evidence to
support the unconstitutionality of a life sentence for a juvenile. Id.
150.
151.

U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

152. Clark, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 422, 494 N.E.2d at 552.
153. Id. at 431, 494 N.E.2d at 559 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976)).
154. Clark, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 431, 494 N.E.2d at 559 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982)).
155. Clark, 144 Ill.App. 3d at 431, 494 N.E.2d at 559.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 421, 494 N.E.2d at 553 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-7(3)(a)
(1985)). See supra notes 128 and 138.
158. In re P.A.F., 134 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 481 N.E.2d 861 (5th Dist. 1985); In re C.T.,
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P.A.E, " a minor on probation for a previous burglary was
charged with attempted arson and criminal trespass. 160 He was adjudicated delinquent for the attempted arson and the trespass: a
violation of the terms of his probation sentence.' 61 The trial court
sentenced the minor to the Department of Corrections for the probation violation, and sentenced him to probation for the criminal
trespass. 162 Regarding to the probation sentence for the criminal
trespass, the trial court found the minor could remain in his parent's custody. 63 Regarding the Department of Corrections sentence for the probation violation, however, the trial court found the
minor's parents to be unfit.' 64 The minor was to serve this incarceration sentence concurrently with the probation sentence. 165 The
juvenile court judge expected the Department of Corrections to
release the minor within a year, at which time the minor would be
under probation for the second delinquent offense upon his return
to his parents' home.
On appeal, the minor asserted that the incarceration sentence
and the concurrent probation sentence were in direct conflict with
each other. 166 The minor relied on People v. Merz, 167 an appellate
decision which held that when there are dispositional conflicts with
specific findings which would support a less harsh disposition, the
less harsh disposition should be imposed. 168 The appellate court in
P.A.F., however, distinguished the minor's situation from the Merz
case, noting that the defendant in Merz was unlikely to commit
another crime and that the defendant's criminal conduct was the
result of unusual circumstances unlikely to recur. 169 In P.A.F, the
court observed that the minor's conduct had become increasingly
more delinquent, and that prior attempts at probation had failed. 170
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District thus held that
the minor's concurrent sentences were not inherently conflicting,
137 Ill. App. 3d 42, 484 N.E.2d 361 (5th Dist. 1985); In re M.L.K., 136 I11.App. 3d 376,
483 N.E.2d 662 (4th Dist. 1985).
159. 134 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 481 N.E.2d 861.
160. P.A.F., 134 Ill. App. 3d at 1067, 481 N.E.2d at 862.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 122 Ill. App. 3d 972, 461 N.E.2d 1380 (2d Dist. 1980).
168. P.A.F., 134 I11.App. 3d at 1067, 481 N.E.2d at 862 (citing People v. Merz, 122
I11. App. 3d 972, 461 N.E.2d 1380 (2d Dist. 1980)).
169. P.A.F., 134 Ill. App. 3d at 1067, 481 N.E.2d at 862.
170. Id. at 1068, 481 N.E.2d at 863.

1986]

Juvenile Law

and affirmed the trial court's disposition. 17 ' The appellate court
approved the trial court's concurrent orders, recognizing that the
findings underlying the probation applied to the minor's circumstances after release from the Department of Corrections.
The Illinois appellate court, again sitting in the Fifth District,
refused to allow the juvenile court to accomplish a similar result by
committing a minor to the Department of Corrections for a determinate time as a condition of his probation.1 72 In In re C. T., a
juvenile committed a theft and was sentenced pursuant to paragraph 705-2(a) of the Juvenile Court Act. 173 At the dispositional
hearing, the minor was sentenced to a five-year term of probation
with the condition that he serve the first eight months of that sentence in the Department of Corrections.' 74 On appeal, the minor
claimed that paragraph 705-2(a) of the Juvenile Court Act did not
authorize a commitment to the Department of Corrections as a
condition of probation. 1'5 The appellate court agreed, holding that
paragraph 705-2 of the Juvenile Court Act defines incarceration
and probation as alternative dispositions which could not be imposed as a combined sentence. 1 The appellate court interpreted
the statute to allow a delinquent minor to be sentenced to probation with up to thirty days detention or to be committed to the
Department of Corrections.'
This sentence was an alternative
disposition without any provisions allowing for a combined sentence. 71 In analyzing the legislative intent of paragraph 705-2 of
the Juvenile Court Act, the court concluded that the rehabilitative
purpose of the statute would be thwarted by an interpretation that
would allow incarceration as a condition of probation.179
Aside from the condition of commitment, a juvenile court can
impose numerous conditions as part of a probation order.8 0 In In
re M.L.K., 18 1 the trial court sentenced a delinquent minor, found
guilty of burglary, to two years probation with several condi76

171. Id. at 1070, 481 N.E.2d at 864.
172. In re C.T., 137 Ill. App. 3d 42, 484 N.E.2d 361 (5th Dist. 1985).
173. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-2(a) (1985)). Paragraph 705-2(a)
defines the types of dispositional orders which may be made for minors who are wards of
the state.
174. CT, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 43, 484 N.E.2d at 362.
175. Id. at 44, 484 N.E. 2d at 363.
176. Id. at 46, 484 N.E.2d at 364.
177. Id. at 45, 484 N.E.2d at 364.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 46, 484 N.E.2d at 364. The appellate court vacated the incarceration part
of the sentence and remanded the case for a new dispositional hearing. Id.
180. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-3(2) 0985).
181. 136 Ill. App. 3d 376, 483 N.E.2d 662 (4th Dist. 1985). The court in MLK. also
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tions. 8 2 The minor claimed that the condition requiring him to
maintain at least a "C" average in school was an abuse of the trial
18 3
court's discretion, and was not reasonably related to his offenses.
The appellate court held that the grade requirement was an appropriate condition of probation. 8 4 The court acknowledged, however, that it should not be a mandatory requirement of probation
that a certain grade point average be maintained, but rather that
8
the minor make all reasonable efforts to achieve such an average.1 5
F. ParentalRights
In In re Sabrina Enis,8 6 an appellate court decision, the court
addressed the standards for terminating parental rights.IS7 Prior to
the termination of parental rights, the juvenile court, at two hearings, found the Enises guilty of two separate incidents of abuse. 8
At these hearings, the State proved physical abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, as required by paragraph 704-6(1) of the Juvenile Court Act. 8 9 Following the two hearings, the State moved
to terminate parental rights pursuant to paragraph 1501D(f) of the
Illinois Adoption Act.190
The provisions of the Illinois Adoption Act allow for termination of parental rights on the finding of two or more incidents of
physical abuse under paragraph 704-8 of the Juvenile Court Act.' 9'
Under the Adoption Act, the standard of proof required for parental unfitness is clear and convincing evidence. 9 2 This standard of
proof is also a due process requirement mandated by the United
addressed the issue of appointment of counsel. See supra notes 69-91 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this issue.
182. ML.K, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 377, 483 N.E.2d at 663. The conditions of probation
included performance of forty hours of public service; payment of restitution; a 10:00
p.m. curfew; regular school attendance; and the maintenance of at least a "C" average in
school. Id.
183. Id. at 377, 381, 483 N.E.2d at 663, 666. The minor's background revealed that
he had friends who were "bad influences" out of school, and friends who were classmates
and "good influences" in school. Id. at 381-82, 483 N.E.2d at 666.
184. Id. at 382, 483 N.E.2d at 666.
185. Id.
186. 145 Ill. App. 3d 753, 495 N.E.2d 1319 (2d Dist. 1986).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 755, 495 N.E.2d at 1320.
189. Id. at 756, 495 N.E.2d at 1320 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-6(1)
(1985)).
190. Enis, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 756, 495 N.E.2d at 1320 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
para 1501D(f) (1985)).
191. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1501 D(f)(1985).
192. Enis, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 756, 495 N.E.2d at 1320.
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States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer. 93 In Enis, two incidents of physical abuse proved only by a preponderance of the evidence under the Juvenile Court Act, however, had been used to
show parental unfitness by clear and convincing proof under the
Adoption Act.194 In effect, the Enis court's application of the statutory provision had reduced the burden of proof by replacing clear
and convincing evidence with two showings of abuse by only a preponderance of the evidence.
On appeal, the Enises asserted that paragraph 1501D(f) of the
Adoption Act violated due process by allowing two abuse incidents
shown only by a preponderance of the evidence to ultimately equal
the higher standard of clear and convincing proof of parental unfitness. 195 The State, on the other hand, claimed that the legislature
could conclude that two findings of physical abuse by a preponderance standard could cumulatively amount to clear and convincing
evidence of parental unfitness.1 96 The court concluded that paragraph 1501D(f) of the Adoption Act essentially allowed termination of parental rights by less than clear and convincing proof of
physical abuse, 197 and that this violated the due process requirements mandated by the Santosky court. 198 Accordingly, paragraph
1501D(f) was held unconstitutional. 199
G. Delays in Adjudicatory Hearings
In In re A.J.,200 four minors claimed they were denied due process when their adjudicatory hearings were delayed almost two
years after the filing of their delinquency petitions, 20 1 pursuant 2to
02
the State's requests for continuances of the scheduled trial dates.
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District agreed.20 3
193. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The Court in Santosky held that clear and convinving
proof was the due process requirement for proving parental unfitness. The Court concluded that the lower preponderance standard allocated the risk of error almost equally
between the parents and the State. This allocation of risk would not accurately reflect the
parent's prevailing interest in maintaining family cohesion. The Court in Santosky held
that the higher standard of clear and convincing proof better reflected the importance of a
decision that would ultimately terminate parental rights. Id. at 769.
194. Enis, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 756, 495 N.E.2d at 1320.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 760, 495 N.E.2d at 1323.
198. Id. at 759, 495 N.E.2d at 1322. See supra note 193.
199. Enis, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 762, 495 N.E.2d at 1324.
200. 135 Ill. App. 3d 494, 481 N.E.2d 1060 (1st Dist. 1985).
201. Id. at 502, 481 N.E.2d at 1066.
202. Id. at 496-97, 481 N.E.2d at 1062-63.
203. Id. at 497, 481 N.E.2d at 1063.
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The appellate court referred to paragraph 704-2 of the Juvenile
Court Act, 2° which provides that an adjudicatory hearing shall be
set within thirty days from the filing of a delinquency petition.20 5
Because the Act used the word "shall", the appellate court in A.J.
determined that the Act directed rather than mandated that the
hearing be held within the thirty day period,2 °6 and that a delay
beyond this recommended time limit did not necessarily warrant a
discharge.2 °7
The court in A.J stated that the juvenile court had an inherent
authority to dismiss a delinquency petition for due process violations as an independent action, distinct from statutory authority by
the Juvenile Court Act. 20 8 The court then applied the following
test to evaluate the reasonableness of the delay.20 9 Initially, the
respondent must go forward with a clear showing of actual and
substantial prejudice resulting from the delay.210 Second, if the
prejudice is evident, the burden shifts to the State to show that the
delay was reasonable. 2 1 The delay must amount to an "unequivocally clear denial of due process. ' 212 The court must then balance
the interests of the defendant and the public in determining
whether to discharge the minor defendant. 1 3 Specific factors con204. Id. at 498, 481 N.E.2d at 1063 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-2
(1985)).
205. Id.
206. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 498, 481 N.E.2d at 1063-64 (citing In re Armour, 59 111.
2d 102, 104-05, 319 N.E.2d 496, 497 (1974)). The court in A.. followed the prior Illinois
decision in Armour. The Illinois Supreme Court in Armour interpreted paragraph 704-2
of the Juvenile Court Act and held that the legislative intent, in using the term "shall",
was to direct, not mandate, that an adjudicatory hearing be held within thirty days of the
filing of a delinquency petition. Because the statute did not say the hearing must be held
within thirty days, the court in Armour determined that the thirty day time period was
merely a suggestive limitation. Id.
207. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 498, 481 N.E.2d at 1063.
208. Id. at 498, 481 N.E.2d at 1064 (citing In re C.T., 120 Ill. App. 3d 922, 926-27,
458 N.E.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Dist. 1983)).
209. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 498-499, 481 N.E.2d at 1064 (citing CT., 120 Ill. App.
3d at 927, 458 N.E.2d at 1094). The court in A.J., applied a test that was established in
CT. The appellate court in C. T adopted criteria which was established in People v.
Lawson, an Illinois criminal court case, to apply to a juvenile court setting. A.J., 135 Ill.
App. 3d at 498, 481 N.E.2d at 1064 (citing People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 367 N.E.2d
1244 (1977)). The court in C. T, used the criteria set forth in Lawson and applied a twostep test to evaluate substantial delays in juvenile court. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 498, 481
N.E.2d at 1064 (citing CT, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 927, 458 N.E.2d at 1094).
210. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 498, 481 N.E.2d at 1064 (citing CT, 120 Ill. App. 3d at
927, 458 N.E.2d at 1094).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 498, 481 N.E.2d at 1064 (citing Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d at
459, 367 N.E.2d at 1248).
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sidered in the balancing include the seriousness of the crime and
the length of the delay. 2 4 Noting that the adjudicatory delay was
almost seven hundred days,215 the court presumed substantial
prejudice and determined that the first prong of the test was satisfied.216 Additionally, the court observed that the Juvenile Court
Act's flexible thirty day adjudicatory hearing requirements reflected the legislative intent to resolve juvenile proceedings more
quickly than adult criminal matters.21 7
The court in A.J. presumed that prejudice existed because of the
substantial delay and held that the burden shifted to the State to
show the reasonableness of the delay. 218 The State asserted that
the victim complainant who was mentally retarded was dependent
on his father for transportation, 21 9 and thus the father's poor
health and hospitalization contributed to the delays. 220 The court,

however, held that regardless of the legitimacy of the State's delays, the interests of the minors and the interests of society must be
balanced. 22 1 The court in A.J further observed that the purpose of

the Juvenile Court Act is preventive and remedial, not punitive.222
The court held that because the delay was excessive, the minors'
interests prevailed. 223 Thus, the appellate court vacated the adjudi-

cation of delinquency and discharged the minors on due process
grounds.224

H.

Definition of CorrectionalEmployees

The Illinois appellate court addressed the battery of a correc214. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 498, 481 N.E.2d at 1064.
215. Id. at 502, 481 N.E.2d at 1066.
216. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 498-99, 481 N.E.2d at 1064.
217. Id. at 500, 481 N.E.2d at 1065. The court in A.J. also noted the recent legislative changes regarding time limits in adjudicatory hearings. Id. The court cited to Public
Act 83-1517, effective as of July 1, 1985, which states that an adjudicatory hearing must
be held within 120 days from the filing of a written demand for such hearing when delinquency petitions have been filed. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, para. 704-2 (1985).
Subsequent to this case, Public Act 84-12 postponed the effective date of this 120 day
overall time limit until April 1, 1986. Currently, House Bill 2785 proposes that only
specific exceptions will be allowed to toll the 120 days in which an adjudicatory hearing
must be held. See infra notes 261-77 and accompanying text.
218. A.J., 135 Ill. App. 3d at 500, 481 N.E.2d at 1065.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 501, 481 N.E.2d at 1065. There was, however, a six month delay period
within the two years when the father was not hospitalized or unable to provide transportation for his child. Id. at 502, 481 N.E.2d at 1066.
221. Id.
222. A.J, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 501, 481 N.E.2d at 1065.
223. Id. at 502, 481 N.E.2d at 1066.
224. Id.
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tional employee in In re V.P..225 In VP., the minor committed a
battery against a group home worker at a youth detention home.226
The trial court found the minor guilty of aggravated battery under
paragraph 12-4(b)(6) of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961,227 and
committed him to the Department of Corrections.228 According to
the statute, a battery against a correctional employee who is engaged in the execution of his official duties, constitutes aggravated
battery. 229 The minor claimed that because the detention home
was not a correctional institution, and the worker not a correctional worker, he had not committed an aggravated battery. 230 The
appellate court disagreed.23 ' The court concluded that the youth
home in this case was the functional equivalent of a correctional
institution, noting that the statute did not define the term correctional institution.232 The court supported its conclusion by observing that the facilities were restrictive and the home was regulated
in accordance with minimum standards established by the Department of Corrections.233 The court concluded that the legislature
intended to afford greater protection to those employees subject to
special risks in performing public duties in correctional institutions
such as the youth home in this case. 3 The court held that the
minor was properly convicted of aggravated battery, and that the
youth detention worker, who worked in a restrictive environment,
was within the statutorily protected scope of "correctional
235
employees.
I

News Media Coverage in Delinquency Proceedings

The appellate court case of In re MB. 236 addressed the relationship of the first amendment rights of the press to the confidentiality
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. 237 This case attracted the
225. 139 Ill. App. 3d 786, 487 N.E.2d 638 (2d Dist. 1985).
226. Id. at 787, 487 N.E.2d at 639.
227. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4(b)(6) (1985)).
228. V.P., 139 Il. App. 3d at 787, 487 N.E.2d at 639.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 790, 487 N.E.2d at 641 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4
(b)(6)(1985)).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 788, 487 N.E.2d at 641.
235. Id. at 789, 487 N.E.2d at 641. This decision has little bearing in juvenile cases in
which the court can impose dispositional orders for offenses by juveniles that would be
misdemeanors if committed by adults.
236. 137 Ill. App. 3d 992, 484 N.E.2d 1154 (4th Dist. 1985).
237. Id. For a further discussion of media coverage in juvenile court proceedings, see
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media's attention because of the nature of the offense.238 The trial
court entered a protective order pursuant to paragraph 705-5 of the
Juvenile Court Act

239

because of the level of public interest in the

case, which resulted in many calls threatening the physical safety
of the minors. 240 The order restricted the news media from reporting or discussing the delinquency hearings. 241 The court in MB.
addressed one news media's motion to vacate the protective order.24 2 The media alleged that the order exceeded the trial court's
authority under the Juvenile Court Act and was an unconstitutional prior restraint on the freedom of the press. 243 The trial court
denied the motion to vacate and the appellate court reversed and
granted the motion. 2"
The appellate court noted that paragraph 705-5 of the Juvenile
Court Act provided for protective orders limited to persons before
the court on original and supplemental petitions,245 and that the
news media was not such a person.246 The court then considered
the validity of the order under paragraph 701-20(6) of the Juvenile
Court Act, 24 7 which excluded the general public from hearings.

The Act provides an exception for the news media and persons
with direct interests in the case. 248 This paragraph further provides
that the court can prohibit any person from disclosing the minor's
Geraghty and Raphael, Reporter's Privilege and Juvenile Anonymity: Two Confidential
Policies on a Collision Course, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (1984).
238. In re M.B., 137 Ill. App. 3d at 993, 484 N.E.2d at 1155.
239. Id. at 994, 484 N.E.2d at 1156 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-5
(1985)).
240. M.B., 137 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 484 N.E.2d at 1160.
241. Id. at 994, 484 N.E.2d at 1156.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 995, 484 N.E.2d at 1156. See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979). Smith was one of the two United States Supreme Court cases that addressed the constitutional issue of media privileges in juvenile court. In Smith, the
Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a West Virginia statute which provided criminal
sanctions for a newspaper's prior written approval by the juvenile court. The Court
found that the purported State interest in protecting the minor's identity in order to further rehabilitate him did not justify prohibiting the publication. The court asserted that if
the media had lawfully obtained the delinquent juvenile's name, it is a violation of the
first amendment right of a free press to prohibit such publication of the name. Id. at 104.
See also Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). In
Oklahoma Publishing,the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional right of the media to
publish the name of a delinquent juvenile which the media had obtained at juvenile proceedings that were open to the public. Id. at 311-312.
244. Id. at 1000, 484 N.E.2d at 1160.
245. Id. at 998, 484 N.E.2d at 1159 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-5
(1985)).
246. M.B., 137 Ill. App. 3d at 998, 482 N.E.2d at 1159.
247. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-20(6) (1985)).
248. MB., 137 Ill. App. 3d at 998-99, 484 N.E.2d at 1159.
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identity if the court shows good cause and the necessity for the
minor's protection.249 Because this statute only allows the suppression of the minor's identity, the court asserted that there was a
strong constitutional presumption against prior restraints on the
press.25°
In M.B., the minors' identities were widespread public knowledge prior to the restraining order.251 In addition, the order did
not prohibit coverage by news media who obtained information independently and did not attend the hearings. 2 Thus, the court
concluded that the order was not the most effective means of protecting the juveniles' physical welfare. 2 5 3 The court held that the
protective order went beyond statutory authority and was an unlawful prior restraint on the news media in violation of the first
amendment of the United States Constitution.254 The court vacated the order excepting the provision which protected the identity of the minor. 5
The Illinois appellate court effectively rejected arguments that
first amendment rights of the media could be infringed in order to
attempt to protect minors from the indignation of the community.
As the court pointed out in MB., the community often knows of a
crime and the offender's identity before court hearings begin.
III.

A.

LEGISLATION

Public Act 84-1318." Investigation of Professionalsfor Child
Abuse and Neglect

Public Act 84-1318 will become effective January 1, 1987.256 It
amends the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. 257 This
Act provides for the investigation of professionals 25 8 who come
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 999, 484 N.E.2d at 1159.
Id.
Id. at 1000, 484 N.E.2d at 1160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1318 (West).
Id.
Id. Numerous professionals are specifically covered by the Act: dentists, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 2323(19), (27) (Supp. 1986); nurses, id. at para. 3420(8), (11);
optometrists, id. at para. 3814(v); physical therapists, id. at para. 4267(P), (Y); doctors,
id. at para. 4433(22), (28); physicians' assistants, id. at para. 4762(8); podiatrists, id. at
para. 4922(o)(p); psychologists, id. at para. 5316(16), (17); social workers, id. at para.
6315(g), (h); athletic trainers, id. at para. 76 16 (p), (x); school personnel, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 122, para. 10-21.4 (Supp. 1986).
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into contact with children, whether in day care centers, schools, or
other institutions responsible for the welfare of children.25 9 According to the bill, when an incident of abuse has been reported
pursuant to the requirements of the Act, the Child Protective Service Unit is to make an initial investigation and determination of
whether the report was a good faith indication of abuse or neglect. 26° Prior to this Act, no provisions mandated investigatory
procedures with regard to child care professionals. This Act facilitates such protective procedures in areas where child abuse is likely
to occur.
The Act provides for revocation of licenses, suspensions, and license issuances for certain professionals who have been named as
perpetrators in reports of child abuse and neglect, and who have
been shown to cause such abuse by clear and convincing evidence.
Nevertheless, this Act is not likely to alter current practice in Illinois, because laws already in effect allow the respective State departments to suspend or revoke certifications or licenses.
B.

Public Act 84-1460: Tolls Jbr Adjudicatory Hearings

Public Act 84-1460 passed both houses on June 30, 1986.261 It
amends certain sections of the Juvenile Court Act. An important
section of the Act alters paragraph 704-2 with respect to time limits for adjudicatory hearings.262 This change is in response to In re
Armour,263 an Illinois Supreme Court decision, which allowed for
the thirty day time provision for adjudicatory hearings to be
merely a directory and not a mandatory provision. 264 The purpose
of this amendment is to limit excuses for delays in adjudicatory
hearings that often occurred as a result of the Armour holding. 265
Paragraph 704-2 of the Juvenile Court Act provides that an adjudicatory hearing must be held within 120 days.2 66 This paragraph specifies limited situations which will toll the time period,
259. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2052 (Supp. 1986).
260. Id. at para. 2057.4.
261. 1986 Il1. Legis. Serv. 84-1460 (West).
262. Id. at § 1 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-2).
263. In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d 102, 319 N.E.2d 496 (1974). See supra note 206 and
accompanying text.
264. Id.
265. This Act has two provisions. One provision will be in effect until January 1,
1988. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
para. 704-2(a)). The other provision will be effective following January 1, 1988. 1986 I11.
Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 7042(b)).
266. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-2 (1985).
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thereby disallowing all other reasons for delays that might arise.26 7
The time period only may be tolled by delays caused by the minor,
continuances after the determination of a minor's physical incapacity for trial, interlocutory appeals, orders for competency exams,
competency hearings, or adjudications of incompetency for trial.26 8
If a minor has more than one delinquency petition pending
against him, an adjudicatory hearing on at least one of them must
occur within the formerly mentioned time limits. 2 69 The remaining
pending petitions shall be adjudicated within 160 days of the finding on the first petition.2 7 ° In addition, the Act alters the time limits for shelter care hearings. 271 Paragraph 704-2 provides that
shelter care hearings must be held within ten judicial days from the
date of the order directing detention or shelter care.2 72 This Act
creates an ultimate time limitation of thirty judicial days from the
date of such order.2 73
The Act provides slightly different provisions for adjudicatory
hearings beginning January 1, 1988.274 Though adjudicatory hearing must be held within 120 days from the time one is requested,
an additional thirty days will be added if the court determines that
the State used due diligence to obtain certain evidence which it
could not initially obtain. 275 In addition to the tolling provisions
to be enacted prior to 1988, the Act states that if the time constraints are not complied with, any party may motion successfully
for the petition to be dismissed with prejudice.27 6 The Act also
states that no minor shall be kept in shelter care after 120 days
from the date of the shelter care order, unless the adjudicatory
267. See The Illinois Action for Foster Children, Illinois Foster Children-Waiting and
Wondering (1986). The Illinois Action for Foster Children ("IAFC"), enacted a
courtwatch project from 1982 to 1983. The result of the project revealed substantial
delays in juvenile court proceedings. These hearing delays often prolonged the stay of
children in temporary care. Public Act 84-1460 limits those delays to specific circumstances. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, para. 704-2).
268. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, para. 704-2(a)(1)).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, para. 704-2(a)(2)).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, para. 704-2(b)).
275. Id.
276. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, para. 704-2(b)(2)).
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hearing has been held or a continuance was granted for good
cause. 277
Decisions regarding delay in adjudicatory hearings have become
less significant because of the statutes which require adjudicatory
hearings in juvenile court within 120 days. The primary effect of
this Act will be felt in larger urban areas which suffer from
crowded juvenile court dockets. Nevertheless, because the majority of juvenile delinquency matters are resolved by dismissal or plea
prior to trial, it is likely that the greater pressure for earlier trials
will be felt in child abuse cases where numerous witnesses often are
necessary to prove circumstantial evidence.
IV.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, the cases in the juvenile law area highlighted a variety of issues. The Illinois courts often focused on the
issue of notice in juvenile proceedings. The Illinois legislature has
attempted to remedy the strict notice requirements for minors with
the passing of Public Act 84-1460. At the appellate level, courts
often affirmed incarceration and probation sentences for juvenile
offenders. The legislature has become increasingly aware of the
growing concern of child abuse. During the Survey year, it passed
Public Act 84-1318, which provides procedures for investigating
professionals who come in contact with children. In sum, the
trend in Illinois seems to be a stricter approach toward juvenile
offenders, and a more cautious and attentive approach toward victims of child abuse and neglect.

277. 1986 Il1. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
para. 704-2(b)(c)). This act also changes requirements concerning service of process on
the minor. 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 84-1460, § 1 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, para. 704-3). See supra note 58 for the section regarding service of summons on
minors.

